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Security against simple eavesdropping attacks is demonstrated for a recently proposed quantum
key distribution protocol which uses the Fibonacci recursion relation to enable high-capacity key
generation with entangled photon pairs. No transmitted pairs need to be discarded in reconciliation;
the only pairs not used for key generation are those used for security-checking. Although the
proposed approach does not allow eavesdropper-induced errors to be detected on single trials, it
can nevertheless reveal the eavesdropper’s action on the quantum channel by detecting changes in
the distribution of outcome probabilities over multiple trials, and can do so as well as the BB84
protocol. The mutual information shared by the participants is calculated and used to show that a
secret key can always be distilled.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,62.23.St,42.25.Fx
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum key distribution (QKD), two legitimate
users of the system, Alice and Bob, attempt to generate
a shared encryption key in such a way that the laws of
quantum mechanics prevent an unauthorized eavesdrop-
per, Eve, from obtaining the key without revealing her
presence. Restricting ourselves here to systems that use
pairs of entangled photons, the most common approach
is the Ekert protocol [1], which is itself an entangled ver-
sion of the earlier BB84 protocol [2]. An embodiment
of this approach using photon polarization works as fol-
lows. Alice and Bob each receive half of the entangled
pair from a common source. Often the source is in Al-
ice’s lab, but it may be under the control of a third party
(or even under the control of Eve herself). As the pho-
tons arrive, Alice and Bob each randomly choose one of
two bases in which to make a linear polarization mea-
surement. One basis consists of horizontal and diagonal
polarization states (|H〉 and |V 〉), the other involves di-
agonal states (ր〉) and (| ց〉) polarized at 45◦ from the
horizontal and vertical. They then communicate on a
classical (possibly public) channel in order to compare
their bases (but not the results of their measurements),
discarding those trials in which they used different bases.
In the simplest possible eavesdropping attack, Eve also
makes a polarization measurement of one photon as it is
en route to Bob. She must guess randomly which mea-
surement basis to use. If she guesses correctly, measuring
in the same basis as Alice and Bob, then she gains full in-
formation about the polarization state and therefore has
complete information about the state of the correspond-
ing key segment. Half of the time she guesses incorrectly,
in which case her outcome is completely random and un-
correlated with Alice’s result. When she sends on the
photon, Bob’s results will also be completely randomized
in the original basis. This disturbance in Bob’s results
allows Eve’s actions to be revealed. Alice and Bob ran-
domly select a subset of their results for a security check,
exchanging the results of their measurements as well as
the basis used on these trials. If Eve intercepts a frac-
tion η of Bob’s photons she introduces an error rate of
η
4 between Alice’s outcomes and Bob’s in the security-
checking subset.
The polarization states have an effective Hilbert space
of dimension 2, allowing a single bit of the key to be ex-
tracted in each polarization measurement. There have
been a number of attempts to generalize the procedure
above with other physical degrees of freedom that have
higher-dimensional effective Hilbert spaces, thereby al-
lowing more than one bit of the key to be generated
per photon [3–7], as well as improved ability to detect
eavesdroppers. One particularly promising way [8–10]
to achieve this goal is to use the photon’s orbital an-
gular momentum (OAM) [11–13] instead of polariza-
tion. The OAM about the propagation axis is quan-
tized, Lz = l~, where the topological charge l can take
on any integer value. If a range of OAM values of size
N is used as the alphabet (for example l = 1, 2, . . . , N or
l = −N−12 , . . . ,+N−12 for even N), then each photon can
be used to determine up to log2N bits of the key. Al-
though in principle such schemes allow unlimited num-
bers of bits per photon, their experimental complexity
increases rapidly with increasing N . For the most part
we will work in this paper with arbitrary N , but in order
to make the discussion more concrete we will at some
points restrict ourselves to an alphabet of size N = 8
(capable of achieving log2 8 = 3 bits per photon). The
generalization to higher values of N is straightforward.
In [14], an approach to high-dimensional QKDwas pro-
posed based on a novel entangled light source [15–19] that
produces output with absolute values of the OAM spec-
trum restricted to the Fibonacci sequence. (Recall that
the Fibonacci sequence starts with initial values F1 = 1
and F2 = 2, generating the rest of the sequence via the
recurrence relation Fn+2 = Fn+1 + Fn.) These states
2pump a nonlinear crystal, leading to spontaneous para-
metric down conversion (SPDC), in which a small propor-
tion of the input photons are split into entangled signal
and idler output photons. After the crystal, any photons
with non-Fibonacci values of OAM are filtered out. An-
gular momentum conservation and the Fibonacci recur-
rence relation conspire to force the two output photons to
have OAM values that are adjacent Fibonacci numbers
(for example Fm and Fm+1). These photons can then
be used to generate a secret key, as detailed in the next
section.
The Fibonacci protocol requires the ability to distin-
guish between single OAM eigenstates and pairwise su-
perpositions of eigenstates. This cannot be done unam-
biguously on a single trial; however, as shown in [28],
an interferometric approach allows statistical discrimina-
tion of the possibilities over multiple trials. Using this
approach, we show in this paper that the outcome prob-
ability distributions can be built up in such a way that
eavesdropping alters them in a detectable manner. In this
way, an eavesdropper can be revealed over multiple trials
even though it may not be possible to identify errors on
any individual trial. This is especially important because
even without eavesdropping there is some probability of
error in discriminating between states in individual trials,
due to the non-orthogonality of the relevant superposi-
tion states. This complication must be dealt with in the
reconciliation stage. BB84 and most other protocols rely
on the rate of errors in individual outcomes for security,
but here we must rely on statistical changes wrought by
the eavesdropper’s actions over many trials. As a result,
rather than using eavesdropper-induced error rates as a
measure of eavesdropper detection, it is more appropri-
ate here to use probability-based measures such as the
disturbance D [21], which is defined in section V.
Section II reviews the procedure for implementing the
Fibonacci protocol in the context of OAMmeasurements.
The effect of eavesdropping is examined in section III.
Details of the means of dealing with the superposition
states are described in section IV, with calculations of
various measures of security carried out in section V and
conclusions in Section VI. A brief discussion of key recon-
ciliation over a classical channel is given in Appendix A,
and detailed expressions for the probability distributions
of outcomes for the protocol appear in Appendix B.
II. SETUP FOR KEY DISTRIBUTION
Here, we review the Fibonacci protocol [14]. The pro-
tocol discussed here is a slightly improved variation on
the original proposal of [14], making use of the appara-
tus described in more detail in [28]. Note that no trials
need to be discarded in the scheme described, aside from
those used for security checking. This is in contrast to
the original version of the Fibonacci protocol [14] where
1
4 of the trials were discarded during reconciliation and
the BB84/Ekert protocol, where 12 must be discarded.
The Fibonacci protocol allows multiple key bits to be
generated per photon. The required basis modulation
can be done in a completely passive manner, and switch-
ing only has to be done between two fixed bases, so that
the complexity of the setup increases much more slowly
with increasing N than in other OAM-based QKD meth-
ods, such as [7].
The basic setup is shown schematically in Fig. 1. The
source on the left (see [14] for more detail) uses a down
conversion source and scattering from an aperiodic spiral
nanoarray [15–19] to create an entangled superposition
of states with Fibonacci-valued OAM states in the two
output directions:
ψ =
∑
n
(|Fn−1〉A|Fn−2〉B + |Fn−2〉A|Fn−1〉B), (1)
where the index n runs over the indices of the al-
lowed Fibonacci numbers in the pump beam: |Ψ〉pump =∑
n |Fn〉. Alice and Bob each receive one photon from the
entangled pair. In each of their labs is a 50/50 beam split-
ter which randomly directs the photon to one of two types
of detection stages. The stage labeled “L-type” detec-
tion consists of an OAM sorter [22–24] followed by a set
of single-photon detectors. The OAM sorter sends OAM
eigenstates with different l values into different outgoing
directions, so that they will be registered in different de-
tectors, thus allowing l to be determined. The other type
of detection (labeled “D type”) is used to distinguish dif-
ferent superpositions |Sn〉 of the form
|Sn〉 = 1√
2
(|Fn−1〉+ |Fn+1〉). (2)
The detection of such superposition states can be ac-
complished in several ways [25–27]. One complica-
tion with the D-type detection is that adjacent su-
perposition states, such as 1√
2
(|Fn−1〉+ |Fn+1〉) and
1√
2
(|Fn+1〉+ |Fn+3〉) are not orthogonal, meaning that
the two states cannot be unambiguously distinguished
from each other. This adds complications to the clas-
sical exchange and alters the corresponding detection
probabilities; however we will see below that this extra
complication is well compensated by increased the key-
generating capacity. Moreover, the degree of complica-
tion does not grow with the size of the alphabet used, so
that the benefits outweigh the complications by a larger
amount as the range of l values increases.
It is necessary to keep the possible key values uniformly
distributed, so that Eve can’t obtain any advantage from
knowledge of the nonuniform distribution. To do this it
will be necessary to make sure that the spectrum of signal
and idler values is broader than the alphabet of values
actually used for the key, since the nonorthogonality of
the superposition states means that measurements can
broaden the range of outgoing values (see section III).
It should be noted that photons are lost from the setup
only once, in the filtering after the crystal; the spiral
before the crystal simply redistributes the energy among
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FIG. 1: Schematic setup for generating cryptographic key
with Fibonacci-valued OAM states.
the available modes through interference effects, with no
net loss of photons or energy. As a result, event rates
should be at levels comparable to other entangled photon
protocols.
For illustration purposes, we will often restrict our-
selves to the case N = 8. Assume that the pump spec-
trum is broad enough to be approximately flat over a
sufficient span to produce signal and idler OAM values
of uniform probability over the range Fm0 to Fm0+N−1,
for some m0. The outcomes for L-type detection (OAM
eigenstates) that will be used for key generation by Alice
and Bob are then simply |Fm0〉, |Fm0+1〉, . . . |Fm0+N−1〉.
For example, if the values N = 8, m0 = 2 are chosen,
then the utilized states are
|lA〉, |lB〉 = {|F2〉, |F3〉, |F4〉, . . . , |F9〉} (3)
= {|2〉, |3〉, |5〉, |8〉, |13〉, |21〉, |34〉, |55〉} .
The outcomes for D-type detection (two-fold OAM su-
perposition states) used by Alice and Bob for key gener-
ation run from
|Sm0〉 =
1√
2
{|Fm0−1〉+ |Fm0+1〉} (4)
to
|Sm0+N−1〉 =
1√
2
{|Fm0+N−2〉+ |Fm0+N〉} . (5)
Detection either of the states |Fn〉 or |Sn〉 by Alice will
correspond to a key value K = Fn. Unfortunately, Al-
ice and Bob will not necessarily agree on the same key
unless further classical information is exchanged to recon-
cile their values. One possible method for reconciliation
is discussed in appendix A.
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FIG. 2: Outcome probabilities for eigenstates. (a) When
there is no eavesdropping and Bob measures in the L basis,
an incoming eigenstate should be detected correctly 100% of
the time. (b) When Eve measures in the D basis, each eigen-
states can result in two different superposition detections. If
she sends one of these superpositions on to Bob, the net result
is that there are now three eigenstates that he could detect.
III. EFFECT OF EAVESDROPPING:
QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION
If an eavesdropper is acting on the photon heading to
Bob, she does not know which type of detection (D or L)
will occur in Alice’s and Bob’s labs. If Alice detects an
eigenstate, then the state arriving at Bob’s end should
be a superposition, whereas if Alice detects a superpo-
sition then the state heading toward Bob should be an
eigenstate. If Eve makes a D-type measurement when
Bob’s photon is in an L state or if she makes an L-type
measurement when Bob’s photon is in a D state, a distur-
bance is made in the statistical distribution of Alice and
Bob’s joint outcomes, which will become apparent when
he compares a random subset of his trials with Alice’s.
In more detail:
(i) Suppose Eve makes a D-type measurement on a
photon which is actually in the eigenstate |Fm〉. She will
detect one of the two superpositions |Fm〉 + |Fm−2〉 or
|Fm〉+ |Fm+2〉, each with 50% probability, and send on a
copy of it. If Bob receives one of these superpositions and
makes an L measurement, he will see one of the values
Fm, Fm−2, or Fm+2, with respective probabilities of
1
2 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 . In Eve’s absence, he should only see Fm with 100%
probability (see Fig. 2).
(ii) On the other hand, suppose Eve makes an L-type
4measurement on a photon which is actually in the super-
position state |Fm〉+ |Fm−2〉. She will detect one of the
two eigenstates |Fm〉 or |Fm−2〉, each with 50% probabil-
ity, and send on a copy of it. If Bob receives one of these
eigenstates and makes a D measurement, he will see one
of the superpositions |Fm〉 + |Fm−2〉, |Fm〉 + |Fm+2〉, or
|Fm−2〉 + |Fm−4〉, with respective probabilities of 12 , 14 ,
1
4 (see fig. 3). Thus, it seems that Bob sees the same
result whether Eve interferes or not. However, by adding
an additional interferometric element to the setup, we
will see (section IV) that Bob will be able to distinguish
between the two cases.
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FIG. 3: Outcome probabilities for superposition states. (a)
When there is no eavesdropping, an incoming superposition
state leads to three possible outcomes when Bob makes a
measurement in the superposition (D) basis: the state can be
identified correctly with probability 1
2
, or it can be misidenti-
fied as one of the other two allowed superpositions that have
nonzero overlap with it. (b) When Eve measures in the L
basis, each of the two possible eigenstates that result can lead
to two different superpositions. The net result is that there
are three outcomes that have nonzero overlap with the two
eigenstates, so that the same probabilities occur as in figure
(a), unless an addition is made to the apparatus (section IV).
It will be desirable to arrange the probabilities of
the possible outcomes into a matrix. However, as seen
above, the process of measurement can cause the range
of states present in the system to spread. States that
are within the range of our alphabet can lead to mea-
surements outside the allowed range (for example, the
in-range state |Sm0+N−1〉 can be measured as the out-
of-range |Sm0+N 〉, since these two states have nonzero
overlap). Similarly, states that are initially outside the
desired range can lead to in-range measurements. This
spreading is greater when Eve is present and introducing
additional measurements. So to account for this and to
maintain the uniform distribution of key values, we al-
low states beyond the desired range to propagate in the
system and include additional rows and columns in the
probability matrix to describe the probability that the
measured state is out of range of the allowed alphabet.
This will be seen explicitly in section V and Appendix
B. Note that we only need to include events in which at
least one of the legitimate participants sees a value out
of range; we can exclude events where the measurements
are out of range for both of them.
IV. DISCRIMINATING SUPERPOSITION
STATES
The discrimination of OAM eigenstates in the L basis
is straightforward and simply requires an OAM sorter.
Discrimination of superposition states in the D basis is
more complicated. As shown in [28], the setup of figure
4 is capable of sorting the superposition states. A pair of
photon-counting detectors Cn and Dn is used at the out-
put ports of the final nonpolarizing beam splitters. If Cn
fires during the key-generating trials, we count that as
an |Sn−1〉 detection. Due to destructive interference, Dn
should not fire for |Sn−1〉 input, so its firing will count
as an |Fn〉 detection. Then the scheme of Appendix A
is used to reconcile Alice’s and Bob’s trials by classical
information exchange in order to arrive at an unambigu-
ously agreed-upon key. During the security checks, we
then look at the distribution of counts in Cn and Dn
separately in order to detect eavesdropper-induced de-
viations from the expected probability distributions. In
order to achieve the indistinguishability required for in-
terference, the OAM of each photon is shifted to zero af-
ter the sorting by a spiral phase plate or by other means.
Measurements with detectors Cn and Dn, respectively,
are equivalent to looking for nonzero projections onto
the states
|Cn〉 = i√
2
(|Fn〉+ |Fn−2〉) = i|Sn−1〉 (6)
|Dn〉 = 1√
2
(|Fn〉 − |Fn−2〉) . (7)
These two sets of states are also mutually nonorthogonal:
〈Cn|Dm〉 = − i2 (δm,n−2 − δm,n+2) . )
There are then multiple possible output states for Alice
and Bob. Each can measure in the L basis and obtain one
of the |Fn〉 states, or they can measure in the D basis and
register one of the |Cn〉 or |Dn〉 states. Their joint output
probabilities for these states can then be found by taking
the incoming state, applying the appropriate projection
operator (|Fn〉〈Fn|, |Cn〉〈Cn|, |Dn〉〈Dn|), and then tak-
ing the inner product of the resulting projection with the
initial state. The effect of Eve’s intervention on Bob’s
channel can be dealt with by inserting similar additional
projection operators representing Eve’s measurements.
5OAM Sorter
FIG. 4: A portion of a detection unit for statistically detect-
ing superpositions of OAM states, analogous to the polar-
ization version of the previous figure. The sorter separates
different OAM values, which are then shifted to zero OAM
by spiral wave plates or holograms (the yellow circles). From
the top downward, the OAM shifters shown change the in-
coming OAM value by ∆l = −Fm−2,−Fm,−Fm+2,−Fm+4.
Superpositions of the form |Fm〉+ |Fm+2〉 cause constructive
interference at the Cm detectors and destructive interference
at the Dm detectors, while OAM eigenstates lead to equal
detection rates at both types.
These extra projection operators tend to spread the prob-
ability distributions out, causing them to be nonzero for
combinations of outcomes that previously had vanishing
probabilities. As a result, Eve’s actions can be revealed
by these alterations in the outcome probabilities.
V. MUTUAL INFORMATION AND SECURITY
For the detection events described in the previous sec-
tions, we may now construct the probability distribu-
tions.
We begin by making some definitions. Pij will be the
joint probability that Alice measures outcome i and Bob
measures outcome j in the absence of eavesdropping. (In
other words, these are the expected probabilities.) PEij
will be the observed probabilities for the same outcomes
in the presence of eavesdropping. The index i labels Al-
ice’s outcomes. i = 1 represents an L-type measurement
with with the measured value out of range of the de-
sired alphabet, while values 2 ≤ i ≤ N +1 correspond to
the event that Alice measured in the L basis and found
state |Fm0+i−2〉; similarly, 1 ≤ j ≤ N + 1 represents
Bob detecting an out-of-range value or measuring state
|Fm0+j−2〉 in the eigenbasis. Value i = N + 2 represents
Alice making an out-of-range detection in the D basis,
while values of i in the range N + 3 ≤ i ≤ 3N + 2 repre-
sent Alice measuring in the diagonal superposition basis
and seeing an event in the C and D detectors. Specif-
ically, i = N + 2k + 3 represents the firing of Cm0+k,
and i = N + 2k + 4 represents the firing of Dm0+k, for
k = 0, . . .N − 1; similarly for Bob with j values in the
same range. P
(A)
i and P
(B)
j will be the expected marginal
probabilities, P
(A)
i =
∑
j Pij and P
(B)
j =
∑
i Pij , with
similar definitions for P
(A)
Ei and P
(B)
Ej .
First, we give the expected probabilities for the states
in the two beams (before Bob’s measurement) in the ab-
sence of eavesdropping. Columns label Alice’s measure-
ments, while rows label Bob’s. The matrix of outcome
probabilities then has the form
P0 =
1
4
(
L0 C0
CT0 D0
)
, (8)
where explicit expressions for the submatrices L0, C0,
and D0 may be found in Appendix B.
The matrices L0 and D0 represent, respectively, the
events on which both Alice and Bob measured in the L
basis or both in the D basis. C0 represents events in
which Alice and Bob measured in different bases, one L
and one D. The factor of 14 in eq. 8 is due to the fact
that each of the four combinations of detection type (LL,
DD, LD, and DL) has a probability of 14 in a given trial.
Now let η be the proportion of trials on which Eve
eavesdrops, i.e. the fraction of the photons on which she
makes measurements. Assume she also randomly mea-
sures (with equal probabilities) in the L or D basis. Then
the probability matrix for Alice and Bob’s outcomes will
change according to:
P0 → P = (1 − η)P0 + ηPE , (9)
where
PE =
1
4
(
L′ C′
F ′ D′
.
)
(10)
The entries in PE give the probability that Eve’s actions
will induce a change in the measured value, given that she
intervened on that particular trial. The new submatrices
L′, C′, D′, and F ′ may be found in Appendix B. We as-
sume for simplicity that Eve only acts on Bob’s channel,
not Alice’s. The more general case can be treated in a
similar manner. Note that F ′ no longer needs to be equal
to C′T due to the asymmetry introduced by this assump-
tion. We define the change in the probability matrix due
to eavesdropping,
∆P = P − P0 (11)
=
η
4
(
L′ − L0 C′ − C0
F ′ − CT0 D′ −D0 .
)
. (12)
The disturbance [21] introduced by the eavesdropper can
be used as a measure of how much effect she is having on
the outcomes of the communication. The disturbance D
is defined to be
D =
√∑
ij
(∆Pij)
2
. (13)
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FIG. 5: The disturbance to the probability distribution, plot-
ted against the eavesdropping fraction, η.
For binary protocols like BB84 the disturbance simply
equals the eavesdropper-induced error rate, so D is an
appropriate generalization to protocols for which there
are more than two possible outcomes per measurement.
Using the probability matrices of Appendix B, D can be
readily calculated. From eqs. 12 and 13 it should clearly
be linear in the eavesdropping fraction η, as verified in
the plot of fig. 5. The disturbance reaches similar values
to those found in [21] for the BB84 protocol.
From the probability distributions, the mutual infor-
mation shared by Alice and Bob can also be computed:
IAB = HA +HB −HAB (14)
= −
∑
i
PA,i log2 PA,i −
∑
j
PB,j log2 PB,j
+
∑
ij
Pi,j log2 Pi,j . (15)
The information per trial gained by Eve can also be
found. First note that the probability that she measures
in the correct basis is 12 . If she guesses the correct basis
then she can determine the correct value for Bob with
certainty; if she guesses the wrong basis, she only has a
50% chance of determining the correct value. So on a
given trial, her probability of obtaining the correct value
is 34 . Therefore, her information gain per trial (her aver-
age mutual information with Alice) is:
IAE = (prob. that Eve listens in on trial) (16)
· (probability trial is not discarded)
· (info. gained per eavesdropping)
= η · r(η) · IAB, (17)
where the fraction r(η) of trials retained is given in Ap-
pendix B.
These two information measures are plotted in fig. 6
as a function of eavesdropping fraction η. It can be seen
that the mutual information per trial gained by Eve is
always less than the mutual information shared between
Alice and Bob, so that a secure key can always be distilled
from the exchange. The secret key rate K = IAB − IAE
η
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n
FIG. 6: The mutual information (upper red curve) shared
between Alice and Bob, and the information gain per trial by
Eve (lower blue curve) as functions of η.
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FIG. 7: The secret key generation rate κ versus eavesdropping
fraction η.
is shown in fig. 7 as a function of η and as a function of
disturbance in fig. 8. The slight upturn in the Alice-Bob
mutual information at large η in Fig. 6 seems to be due
to the fact that Eve’s interference causes the outcomes
to be more spread out (there are more nonzero entries
in PE than in P0), and more uniform distributions lead
to increased information gains per measurement. Due to
the concave shape of the binary entropy function, such
an effect can also happen in schemes using binary qubits,
if the error rate is able to exceed 50%.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have constructed the joint probabil-
ity distributions for Alice and Bob’s measurement out-
comes in the Fibonacci protocol, both in the absence of
eavesdropping and for the case of simple intercept-resend
attacks. For the case of three bits per photon, it has
been demonstrated that a secure key can be distilled and
that the eavesdropper’s presence can be revealed. For
larger alphabets (more key bits per photon), the mutual
information shared by Alice and Bob increases logarith-
mically with alphabet size, while the amount of classical
information that needs to be exchanged stays constant.
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Disturbance
FIG. 8: The secret key rate κ as function of disturbance, D.
It remains for future investigation to see how the protocol
behaves under more sophisticated eavesdropping attacks.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the DARPA QUI-
NESS program through US Army Research Office award
W31P4Q-12-1-0015
Appendix A: Reconciliation
In order for Alice and Bob to determine each other’s
values they must exchange additional information on a
classical side channel. Here, a brief description is given
of one way to do this. Other methods are also possible.
It is necessary to make sure that no eavesdropper can
obtain the key from the classical exchange alone.
If Eve intercepts both the classical and quantum ex-
changes, and if she can store the photon from the quan-
tum channel until she has read the classical channel, then
she has complete information about the bit, just as Bob
does. However, the disturbances she introduces will then
signal her presence, causing the tainted key to be dis-
carded. This is identical to the case in the BB84 or Ekert
protocols.
However, in the Fibonacci case a larger classical ex-
change is required, which reduces the average amount of
information about the key that remains secret. This re-
duces the key generation capacity per photon, partially
canceling the advantages from the larger Hilbert space.
But even in the worst case the classical exchange can be
chosen such that the amount of classically revealed in-
formation remains less than the amount of information
generated by the quantum exchange, allowing the dis-
tillation of a secure key [20]. Furthermore, the amount
of revealed information is independent of N , while the
total information from the quantum exchange increases
with increasing alphabet size like log2N ; thus this infor-
mation leakage becomes more and more negligible with
increasing N , as compared to the total information.
When both experimenters measure in the L (eigen-
state) basis, they should (in the absence of eavesdrop-
ping) always receive adjacent Fibonacci numbers, say
Fn and Fn+1, although initially neither of them knows
whether they have the lower or higher value in the pair.
In order for them to determine this, they must each ex-
change one bit of information over the classical channel.
One possible way to do this (illustrated for the case
N = 8, m0 = 2), is for Alice first to send either a 0 or 1
to Bob in the following manner:
Alice has: 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55
Alice sends: 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
(18)
Once Bob receives this information he can determine Al-
ice’s value, since he already knows it has to be one of
the two values adjacent to his. Alice’s value can then be
used as the key value. For arbitrary N , the probability of
guessing the correct value based on the classical exchange
alone decreases with increasing N : P = 2
N
.
Half of the time, Alice and Bob make opposite types
of measurements, one L and one D. Suppose, for ex-
ample, Alice measures the value F5 = 8 in the L ba-
sis, while Bob measures in D. In principle, he should
receive the superposition state 1√
2
(|5〉+ |13〉); however,
since non-orthogonal states can not be uniquely distin-
guished, there is a 25% chance that Bob will instead mea-
sure the superposition 1√
2
(|2〉+ |5〉) and 25% that he will
find 1√
2
(|13〉+ |34〉). To arrive at an unambiguous value
shared by both participants, there are several possible
procedures. One possibility (again described for the case
N = 8, m0 = 2) is for Alice to send Bob two bits of
information, according to the following table:
Alice has: 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55
Alice sends: 01 10 00 01 10 00 01 10
(19)
Bob then knows Alice’s value unambiguously, so that
they can agree to use her value as the key segment; again,
there is no need for Bob to send any classical informa-
tion in this case. As N increases, the number of key bits
generated per photon grows but the amount of classical
information exchanged remains fixed.
Finally, Alice and Bob can both make a D measure-
ment. Suppose that Alice sends two bits of classical in-
formation, which could be:
Alice has: S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S8 S9 S10 S11 . . .
Alice sends: 00 00 01 01 10 10 11 11 00 00 . . .
(20)
Examination of the probability matrices (eqs. 27-28)
makes clear that, armed with knowledge of his own su-
perposition, Bob can unambiguously determine Alice’s
value, while an outsider eavesdropper on the classical
channel again has a decreasing probability of guessing
the correct value as N increases. Once Alice and Bob
agree that Alice has superposition |Sn〉, they then adopt
the value Fn as the key value.
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FIG. 9: The labeling of rows and columns is shown for the
probability submatrices. Different rows correspond to differ-
ent outcomes for Bob, while columns correspond to Alice’s
outcomes. The first row and column label detection of out-
comes not included in the range of the alphabet used for key
generation. The remaining rows and columns of L0 label al-
lowed eigenstates, and those of D0 alternately label Cn and
Dn detection events signalling allowed superposition states.
Similarly, C0 has eigenstate events running horizontally, with
Cn and Dn events vertically. L0, C0, and D0 are respectively
(N+1)×(N+1), (N+1)×(2N +1), and (2N+1)×(2N+1)
matrices.
Appendix B: Probability Matrices
Here we give explicit expressions for the joint proba-
bility distributions seen by Alice and Bob for their out-
comes, with and without eavesdropping. See section V
for the relevant definitions. The labeling of the rows and
columns is shown in fig. 9.
To compute the probabilities in the absence of eaves-
dropping, first consider the projections of the biphoton
state |ψ〉 after the crystal (eq. 1) onto the states that
can be detected at the various detectors on Alice’s side:
|ΨAFn〉 = |Fn〉A A〈Fn|ψ〉 (21)
=
1√
2
|Fn〉A
(|Fn−1〉B + |Fn+1〉B) (22)
|ΨADn〉 = |Dn〉A A〈Dn|ψ〉 (23)
= − i
2
|Dn〉A (24)
×(|Fn−3〉B ++2|Fn−1〉B + |Fn+1〉B)
|ΨACn〉 = |Cn〉A A〈Cn|ψ〉 (25)
=
1
2
|Cn〉A
(|Fn+1〉B − |Fn−3〉B), (26)
with similar expressions for the states |ΨBFn〉, |ΨBCn〉,
|ΨBDn〉 on Bob’s side. Then (up to an overall constant
that can be fixed by the requiring the probabilities to
sum to one) the matrix for the probabilities of joint de-
tections by Alice and Bob can be built up entry by en-
try by computing the various products 〈ΨAXn |ΨBYm〉, for
X,Y = C,D, F . We give here the results for N = 8; the
generalization to larger N is straightforward. The results
are:
L0 =
1
16


0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0


C0 =
1
72


0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
2 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0


(27)
D0 =
1
196


0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 6 4 6 4
6 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1


(28)
9Eve’s measurements will alter Bob’s outcome probabil-
ities. If η be the proportion of trials she intercepts, then
the probability matrix for Alice and Bob’s outcomes will
change according to P0 → P = ηPE + (1 − η)P0, where
PE describes the change in probability due to Eve’s inter-
vention on a given trial. The various joint probabilities
are computed as before, but with additional projection
operators inserted into Bob’s line to represent Eve’s ac-
tion. For example, when Alice and Bob measure in the
L basis and Eve measures in the D basis, the probability
that Alice detects Fp and Bob detects Fn has extra terms
added to it of the form∑
m
{
〈ΨAFp |ΨBCm〉|〈Cm|Fn〉|2 (29)
+〈ΨAFp |ΨBDm〉|〈Dm|Fn〉|2
}
;
these extra terms correspond to the possible outcomes
of Eve’s measurement. Similar expressions apply to find
the rest of the probabilities. The net result (for N = 8)
is: PE =
1
4
(
L′ C′
F ′ D′
)
, where the new submatrices are
L
′ =
1
122


0 1 0 0 1 1 6 6 11
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 5 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 5 0 5 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 5 0 5 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 5 0 5 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0


F
′ =
1
1380


0 5 5 5 5 45 45 91 91
39 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
52 28 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 0
52 0 28 0 4 0 0 0 0
13 26 0 12 0 1 0 0 0
32 20 0 28 0 4 0 0 0
13 0 26 0 12 0 1 0 0
32 0 20 0 28 0 4 0 0
1 12 0 26 0 12 0 1 0
4 28 0 20 0 28 0 4 0
1 12 0 26 0 12 0 1 0
4 0 28 0 20 0 28 0 4
1 0 1 0 12 0 26 0 12
4 0 4 0 28 0 20 0 28
1 1 0 12 0 26 0 12 0
4 4 0 28 0 20 0 28 0
1 0 1 0 12 0 26 0 12
4 0 4 0 28 0 20 0 28


(30)
C
′
=
1
664


0 27 15 27 15 13 9 13 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
6 10 6 0 0 14 6 0 0 10 6 0 0 3 3 0 0
6 0 0 10 6 0 0 14 6 0 0 10 6 0 0 3 3
6 3 3 0 0 10 6 0 0 14 6 0 0 10 6 0 0
6 0 0 3 3 0 0 10 6 0 0 14 6 0 0 10 6
22 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 10 6 0 0 14 6 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 10 6 0 0 14 6
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 10 6 0 0 0
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 10 6


(31)
D
′ =
1
4294


0 103 120 28 36 28 36 4 8 4 8 28 36 28 36 103 120
163 0 0 61 68 1 1 0 0 13 18 0 0 1 2 0 0
60 0 0 14 16 1 1 0 0 13 14 0 0 1 2 0 0
34 61 68 0 0 61 68 0 0 13 18 0 0 1 2 0 0
30 14 16 0 0 14 16 0 0 13 14 0 0 1 2 0 0
34 0 0 61 68 0 0 61 68 0 0 13 18 0 0 1 2
30 0 0 14 16 0 0 14 16 0 0 13 14 0 0 1 2
6 13 18 0 0 61 68 0 0 61 68 0 0 13 18 0 0
6 13 14 0 0 14 16 0 0 14 16 0 0 13 14 0 0
6 0 0 13 18 0 0 61 68 0 0 61 68 0 0 13 18
6 0 0 13 14 0 0 14 16 0 0 14 16 0 0 13 14
34 1 2 0 0 13 18 0 0 61 68 0 0 61 68 0 0
30 1 2 0 0 13 14 0 0 14 16 0 0 14 16 0 0
34 0 0 1 2 0 0 13 18 0 0 61 68 0 0 61 68
30 0 0 1 2 0 0 13 14 0 0 14 16 0 0 14 16
163 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 13 18 0 0 61 68 0 0
60 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 13 14 0 0 14 16 0 0


(32)
Note that the matrix is no longer symmetric due to the
fact that we are assuming Eve has access only to Bob’s
line but not Alice’s. In particular, this means that F ′ is
not equal to the transpose of C′.
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